摘要
业绩型股权激励是我国上市公司股权激励制度安排的特色,管理层会有比较强烈的动机通过盈余管理达成行权或解锁的业绩条件。以庄园股份2018年实施的股权激励计划为例,基于股权激励下盈余管理的动态分析视角,分析股权激励计划实施过程中上市公司盈余管理行为变化。研究表明,从股价表现、季度净利润波动和非经常性损益(政府补助)三个方面,均表明了庄园牧场在授予日前存在向下的盈余管理,而在授予日后的锁定期内存在向上的盈余管理;进一步利用应计利润随机游走模型与应计利润分离模型验证了公司的盈余管理行为及其变化。研究结论既理论价值,也有现实意义。
Performance-based equity incentive is a feature of equity incentive plan of listed companies in China,and the management level has a strong motivation to attain the exercise and unlock performance conditions by way of earnings management.This paper,taking the equity incentive plan adopted by Zhuangyuan Rangeland in the year 2018 as an example,analyzes the evolution of earnings management of the listed companies in the process of implementing equity incentive plans,from the perspective of a dynamic analysis of earnings management under equity incentive.The research result shows that the earnings management was inclined to go downward before the grant date and go upward after the date,viewed from stock price,quarterly net profit fluctuation and non-recurring gains and losses(government subsidies).A Further study,carried out with the accrual-based random-walk model and the separate accruals models,verifies the research results,which are not only of theoretical value but also of practical significance.
作者
赵艳
高风
Zhao Yan;Gao Feng
出处
《山东理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2020年第1期16-24,共9页
Journal of Shandong University of Technology（Social Sciences Edition）
基金
山东省社会科学规划研究项目“模块化生产网络价值创新助力新旧动能转换研究”(18CKJJ26)
教育部规划基金项目“政府补贴对科技型中小企业创新能力的影响机理及效果研究”(18YJA630029)
关键词
盈余管理
股权激励
业绩考核
庄园牧场
earnings management
equity incentive
performance evaluation
Zhuangyuan Rangeland
