摘要
基于当前中国银行业薪酬激励的制度特征,从理论和实证两个方面证明了普通员工薪酬激励会引起商业银行风险承担的增加。造成这种影响的直接原因是商业银行以规模为导向的薪酬激励机制,而根源在于监管当局"大而不倒"的监管取向。基本逻辑是:"大而不倒"的监管立场引起了商业银行对规模的过度偏好,促使银行通过薪酬机制设计来激励员工扩大贷款项目以创造存款规模,这势必弱化银行的风险控制动机,进而导致过度的风险承担。
Based on the current institutional characteristics of China’s banking industry’s salary incentives,this paper proves that the salary incentives of ordinary employees will indeed increase the risk exposure of commercial banks from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The direct cause of this impact is the scale-oriented compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks,and the root cause lies in the regulatory orientation of "too big to fail" by the regulatory authorities. The basic logic is that the overwhelming regulatory stance has caused commercial banks to over-type their size,prompting banks to use incentives to design incentives for employees to expand their loan projects to create deposit scales,which will weaken the bank’s risk control motives and lead to excessive risk taking.
作者
李廷瑞
李博阳
LI Tingrui;LI Boyang(School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an Shaanxi 710061,China)
出处
《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期70-81,108,共13页
Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition
基金
国家建设高水平大学公派留学生项目(201706280313)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(19YJA790063)
关键词
商业银行
员工薪酬激励
风险承担
commercial banks
employee compensation incentive
risk taking
