摘要
在中国府际关系的行政发包制结构中,从治理风险"外溢性"和实际控制权"不确定性"双重维度审视避责行为可以发现,当治理风险溢出了地方(下级)政府"不确定"的实际控制权范围时,地方(下级)政府形成避责联合体以最大限度地减轻来自中央(上级)政府问责压力,这就是府际联合避责。府际联合避责在纵、横两个方向上展开,纵向上形成了密切合作的避责联合体与结构松散的避责联合体,横向上形成了内部竞争的避责联合体与临时拼凑的避责联合体。府际联合避责的防治需要将公共事务治理的受益范围作为实际控制权的划分依据,将民生指标作为地方官员政绩考核体系的核心指标,构建动态精准的风险识别和防控机制。
In the administrative subcontract structure,when examining BAB from the dual perspectives of the governance risk externalities and uncertainty of actual controlling power,it could be found that when governance risk is beyond the realm of uncertain actual controlling power,local(subordinate)governments would constitute a blame avoidance coalition to release the accountability pressure from central(superior)government as much as possible,this could be named as coalitional blame avoidance among local governments. This behavior proceeds in both vertical and horizontal directions,the former generates intimate cooperative blame avoidance coalition and unconsolidated structural blame avoidance coalition,while the latter forms internal competitive blame avoidance coalition and occasional medley blame avoidance coalition. To prevent coalitional blame avoidance behavior,the benefit range of public affairs governance should be established as the distribution basis of actual control power,the livelihood index should be treated as the core indicators in the political performance appraisal system,and a dynamic and precise risk identification and prevention mechanism is also necessary.
作者
李晓飞
Li Xiaofei(School of Public Administration,Central South University.Changsha 410083)
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第10期94-100,共7页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目“城市社区群租风险的包容性治理研究”（编号：19CZZ019）
关键词
府际联合避责
行政发包制
避责联合体
治理风险
实际控制权
coalitional blame avoidance among local governments
administrative subcontract
blame avoidance coalition
risk of governance
actual controlling power
