摘要
在经济学理论的推动下,现代反垄断法的基本分析方式经历了从当然违法原则向合理原则转变的过程。但合理原则也使得反垄断分析变得复杂而成本高昂。更重要的是,合理原则与法律的规范性存在明显冲突,会产生违反法治原则、削弱威慑效果的后果。因而有必要反思经济学与反垄断法进一步融合的方式。通过对四种制度成本的分析可以看到,当然违法原则在案件查处成本、行政成本上更低。虽然立法成本更高,但通过提高反垄断法的类型化程度,当然违法原则也具有规则适用上的成本优势。同时,就动态规制效果而言,当然违法下的错误成本要比传统理念所认为的更小。因此,反垄断法的规范性要求经济学和反垄断法以新的方式融合,更多地适用当然违法原则。
Driven by the continuous development in economics,contem porary antitrust law has expe rienced the transition from per se illegality to the rule of reason. However,rule of reason makes antitrust analysis more complex and costlier. It also generates obvious conflicts with the norm ativity of law,there by contaminating the rule of law and weakening the deterrent effect of enforcement. Therefore it is nec essary to reflect on the further integration of antitrust law with economics. After evaluating the four types of institutional costs,advantages of per se illegality are observed in lowering investigation costs and administrative costs. Although the legislative costs might be still higher than the rule of reason,per se illegality still wins an edge when the categorization within antitrust law is improved. In the meanwhile,the error costs related to per se illegality are certainly exaggerated by conventional understanding when evalu ated under dynamic regulation. Consequently,the normativity of antitrust law requires the integration in a new way,as well as more application for per se illegality.
出处
《中外法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期1004-1024,共21页
Peking University Law Journal
基金
国家社科基金一般项目“中国反垄断法的移植与本土化研究”（项目编号：18BFX150）的阶段性成果
