摘要
本文以我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了大股东股权质押对上市公司投资效率的影响。研究发现:大股东股权质押导致了上市公司非效率投资;这种非效率投资既会表现为过度投资,也会表现为投资不足;不同产权性质的公司中两者的关系有所差异,国有企业中,大股东股权质押仅会导致过度投资,而在非国有企业中,两种非效率投资现象同时存在。本文丰富了关于大股东股权质押经济后果的研究,并有助于监管当局强化监督。
This paper studies the impact of stock pledge by large shareholder on the investment efficiency of listed enterprises in China.The research finds that the large shareholder' share pledge leads to inefficient investment of listed enterprises.This kind of inefficient investment can be presented as both overinvestment and underinvestment and the relationship between the two is different in enterprises with different attribute of control rights.In state-owned enterprises,the large shareholder' share pledge only leads to overinv-estment,while in non-state-owned enterprises,two inefficient investment phenomena exist simultaneously.The research enriches the research on the economic results of the large shareholder' share pledge,and can help the regulatory authorities to strengthen supervision.
作者
李伟
张钰婧
程铖
Wei Li;Yujing Zhang;Cheng Cheng
出处
《会计论坛》
2019年第1期95-115,共21页
Accounting Forum
基金
校级科研重点项目(16A002)
关键词
股权质押
非效率投资
投资不足
投资过度
Stock pledge
Inefficient investment
Underinvestment
Overinvestment
