摘要
优化地方财政支出结构是科学划分地方政府间财权、事权与支出责任的重要着力点之一。本文以地方政府间权责安排为视角,收集并整理286个地级市层面2015—2017年的相关数据,运用广义矩估计方法(GMM),分析财政分权程度省际差异下财政压力与地方政府基本公共服务支出偏向之间的相关关系。研究结果表明,在地方上下级政府间权责关系基本协调、匹配的基础上,地方政府财政压力的增加不会显著影响其基本公共服务支出偏向。但当地方上下级政府间存在权责错配时,财政压力的增加则会显著降低地方政府基本公共服务支出偏向。因此,在确保地方各级政府间财权、事权与支出责任基本协调和一一对应的基础上,省级政府应逐级下放财权、事权与支出责任至县级政府,或者上收部分财权、事权与支出责任来维持省级与县级政府在承担事权与支出责任上的主体地位。
Optimizing the structure of local fiscal expenditure is one of the important points for scientifically and rationally dividing the financial power, administrative power and expenditure responsibilities among local governments. However, the central government s previous reforms of local financial management system rarely touched the division of administrative powers and expenditure responsibilities. As a result, when under financial pressure, local governments would go beyond, neglect or misplace their functions in providing public goods, exercising the corresponding administrative powers and fulfilling expenditure responsibilities. At the same time, the local inter-governmental division of powers and responsibilities, as shown in the decentralization of intra-governmental fiscal revenue and expenditure, will vary according to the differentiated fiscal management system of each province (autonomous region). Based on this, this paper collects and collates relevant data of 286 prefecture-level cities from 2015 to 2017 from the perspective of local inter-governmental division of powers and responsibilities, and uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) to analyze the correlation between the fiscal pressure and local government s basic public service expenditure bias with the given provincial difference in the degree of fiscal decentralization. The research results show that the increase of local government financial pressure will not significantly affect the bias of basic public service expenditure in case of basic coordination and matching of the power and responsibility among local governments at different levels. However, when there is a mismatch, the increase in fiscal pressure will significantly reduce the local public service expenditure bias. Based on this, the paper proposes that while ensuring the basic coordination of financial power, administrative power and expenditure responsibilities among local governments at various levels, the provincial government should delegate financial power, administrative power and expenditure responsibility to the county government level by level or retrieve some of them to make sure provincial and county governments play the main role in exercising the administrative power and fulfilling expenditure responsibility.
作者
孙开
张磊
SUN Kai;ZHANG Lei(Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,116025)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第8期18-32,共15页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国的政府间事权与支出责任划分研究”(16ZDA066)
关键词
分权程度
支出偏向
权责安排
财政压力
Decentralization
Expenditure Bias
Power and Responsibility Arrangement
Fiscal Pressure
