摘要
控股股东股权质押日益成为投资者、监管层等各方关注的重要现象。控股股东质押股权后增大了控制权转移的风险,使其有动机通过审计意见购买进行信息操纵,以维持股价、降低控制权转移风险。文章以沪深A股上市公司2007-2017年的数据为样本,研究了控股股东股权质押对上市公司审计意见购买行为的影响。研究发现,控股股东进行了股权质押的上市公司更多地进行了审计意见购买,且当控股股东股权质押比例较高、公司股价下跌风险较大、产权性质为民营、媒体负面报道较多时这一现象更为显著。结论丰富了控股股东股权质押对上市公司行为影响的研究,拓展了企业审计意见购买行为影响因素相关研究的分析视角,为监管层决策分析和相关工作的开展提供了理论参考和支持。
The risk of control rights transfer after the controlling shareholder pledges his stock right motivate him to manipulate the information through audit opinion shopping so as to support the stock price and reduce the risk of control rights transfer. Based on the related data of firms listed on A-share markets between 2007 and 2017, this paper examines the influence of controlling shareholder's share pledge on the opinion shopping behavior of listed companies. It is found that, compared with firms without shares pledge by controlling shareholders, firms with controlling shareholder's share pledge are more likely to purchase audit opinion. This positive relation is much stronger when the pledge ratio is higher, when the stock price crash risk is higher, when the firm is private-owned or when the company faces more negative media coverage. This paper enriches literature on how controlling shareholder^ share pledge affect company behavior and expand the perspective of analyzing the influences of audit opinion shopping. This study also provides theoretical reference and support for regulators and help them make decisions in a more targeted and effective manner.
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期108-118,共11页
Auditing Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71602053)
湖南省自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:2018JJ3087)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(项目批准号:2016M602413)的资助
关键词
股权质押
审计意见购买
控股股东
控制权
媒体负面报道
share pledge
audit opinion shopping
controlling shareholder
negative media coverage
