摘要
文章以2016年我国创业板上市公司为研究样本,检验企业内部风险管控能力对创新效率的影响,以及高管激励对内部控制与创新效率之间关系的调节作用。实证结果表明,内部风险管控能力与创新效率显著负相关,验证了创新型企业存在"内部控制悖论"的现象;高管激励与创新效率显著正相关,但高管激励对于内部风险管控与创新效率之间的关系不具有明显的调节作用。因此,创新型企业在进行内部风险管控时,应注重对高管创新积极性的保护;通过完善高管激励机制,弱化"内部控制悖论"现象。
Taking China＇s GEM listed companies as a sample in 2016, the impact of internal risk management and control capabilities on innovation efficiency and the effect of senior management incentives on the relationship between internal control and innovation efficiency were examined. The empirical results show that the company＇s internal control capacity is significantly and negatively related to innovation efficiency, verifying the existence of ＂ internal control paradox＂ ; executive incentives and innovation efficiency are significantly positively correlated, but the relationship between executive incentives for internal control and innovation efficiency does not have a clear regulatory role. Therefore, innovative enterprises should take into account the protection of the innovation enthusiasm of senior executives when carrying out internal risk control, and weaken the phenomenon of ＂internal control paradox＂ by perfecting the incentive mechanism of senior executives.
作者
刘晓慧
王爱国
刘西国
LIU Xiao-hui;WANG Ai-guo;LIU Xi-guo(Business School,University of Jinan,Jinan 250002,China;School of Accountancy,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)
出处
《经济体制改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期117-124,共8页
Reform of Economic System
基金
山东省社会科学规划研究重大项目"绿色治理研究"(16AWTJ07)
关键词
创新型企业
内部控制悖论
高管激励方式
创新效率
innovative enterprises
internal control paradox
executive excitation
innovation efficiency
