摘要
以智能电子产品供应链为背景,针对有限产能下供应链中各方的产量决策这一问题,基于博弈论和约束极值理论,建立有限产能下供应链中的三阶段博弈模型,刻画了博弈均衡和均衡下各方的利润分配,分析了模型参数对均衡及各方利润的影响.发现上游供应商（同时也是下游制造商的竞争者）有可能利用其产能将下游制造商挤出市场,而额外订购的选项对下游制造商而言并不能完全抵消未能从上游获得足够产能分配额的影响.研究结论为有限产能下智能电子产品供应链中各方的产量竞争提供了有益的管理启示.
Motivated by the phenomena in intelligent electronics supply chains, we study capacity/output decision-making in a supply chain with limited capacity. Based on game theory and constrained extreme value theory, we build a three-stage game model, characterize the corresponding equilibrium and the profit division amongst the supply chain. We also conduct sensitivity analysis to see the effect of the parameters.We find that the supplier（also as a competitor to the buyer） may leverage the limited capacity to push the buyer out of the market, while an additional buying option does not necessarily neutralize the supply shortage threat for the buyer. Our conclusions can provide meaningful managerial insights with respect to the quantity competition in intelligent electronics supply chains.
作者
吉清凯
胡祥培
赵达
JI Qingkai;HU Xiangpei;ZHAO Da(School of Economics and Management,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China;Faculty of Management and Economics,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第10期2578-2586,共9页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71701057,71421001)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金(17YJC630046)
海南省自然科学基金(718QN225)~~
关键词
供应链管理
有限产能
产量博弈
智能电子产品
supply chain management
limited capacity
quantity competition
intelligent electronics
