摘要
上市企业披露的内部控制缺陷信息被很多新闻媒体当作负面报道广泛传播,与此同时,大量上市企业未披露实际存在的内部控制缺陷。在此背景下研究负面偏好对上市企业披露内部控制缺陷信息的影响具有重要意义。以2012年至2017年中国A股主板市场上有内部控制重大缺陷迹象的企业为样本,从负面偏好的坏消息过度反应和事物类别诊断两个层面分别探究中国强制实施内部控制信息披露以来,上市企业披露内部控制缺陷信息与来自主要外部利益相关方负面后果之间的关系。采用Tobit、Probit和OLS回归估计方法,检验披露内部控制缺陷信息与来自监管机构、诉讼相关方、审计师和投资者4个外部利益相关方的负面后果之间的关系,并研究企业披露的内部控制缺陷信息数量与负面后果程度之间的关系。之后进一步探究内部控制质量对披露内部控制缺陷信息负面效应的调节作用。研究结果表明,(1)对于有内部控制重大缺陷迹象的企业而言,披露内部控制缺陷信息更易引起负面后果,现阶段的内部控制监管机制对此没有构成有效的威慑;(2)外部利益相关方对内部控制缺陷信息的过度反应对企业有实质性影响,披露内部控制缺陷信息显著引起监管处罚、诉讼仲裁、非正常审计师变更和负面市场反应;(3)披露内部控制缺陷信息的充分程度与负面后果的严重程度之间存在倒U形关系,充分披露内部控制缺陷信息能够削弱与之相对应的负面后果;(4)内部控制质量能够正向调节充分披露内部控制缺陷信息对负面后果的削弱作用。负面偏好的影响在一定程度上削弱了上市企业披露内部控制缺陷信息的内生动力,催生上市企业对内部控制缺陷信息的更多隐瞒和不充分披露,即"劣币驱逐良币"。研究结论为研究内部控制缺陷信息的真实性提供一个新视角,也为完善内部控制制度和相关部门开展监管工作提供相应的经验证据。
The internal control deficiencies disclosed by the listed companies are widely disseminated by many news media as negative reports. At the same time, a large number of listed companies conceal or avoid the important and dwell on the trivial to disclose the actual internal control deficiencies. Under this background, it is of great significance to study negative bias on listed companies＇ disclosure of internal control deficiency information. Taking the companies with internal control deficiencies in the market of A-share main board in China from 2012 to 2017 as research samples, this study explored the relationship between the disclosure of internal control deficiency information and the negative consequences from the two aspects of the negative preference, namely, bad news overreaction and category diagnosis. We use the Tobit, OLS and Logit regression to explore the relationship between the disclosure of internal control deficiency infor- mation and negative consequences from regulators, litigants, auditors, then analyze the relationship between the number of internal control deficiency information disclosed by companies and the degree of negative consequences. Based on this, we further explore the regulatory effect of internal control quality on the negative effects of disclosure of internal control deficiency information. The results show that： ①For companies with signs of internal control weakness, disclosure is more likely to result in negative consequences than concealing deficiencies. The internal control supervision mechanism at this stage does not constitute an effective deterrent to this; ②he overreactions of external stakeholders to internal control deficiencies information have a substantial impact on the enterprise, and disclosure of internal control deficiency information significantly incur regulatory penalties, litigation, abnormal auditor change and negative market reaction; ③here exists an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the degree of full disclosure of the company＇s deficiencies and the severity of negative consequences, and full disclosure of internal control deficiency information can weaken the corresponding negative consequences ; ④Intemal control quality and the quality of internal control information disclosure can positively regulate the weakenin,, effect of adeauate disclosure on negative consequences. Negative Bias weakens the endogenous motivation of listed companies to disclose the information of internal control deficien- cy to some extent, and it is easy to lead to more concealment and inadequate disclosure, which was called ＂bad money drives out good＂. The conclusion of the study provides a new perspective for the research on the factieity of internal control deficiency infor- mation, and also provides relevant empirical evidence for the improvement of the internal control system and the supervision of relevant denartments.
作者
佘晓燕
毕建琴
SHE Xiaoyan;BI Jianqin(Accounting School, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China)
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期45-61,共17页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71262017)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJA790067)~~
关键词
内部控制缺陷信息
内部控制质量
负面偏好
负面后果
internal control deficiency information
internal control quality
negative bias
negative consequences
