摘要
救济成本的合理分担是构建高效专利权救济规则体系的关键。《专利法》修改草案送审稿1试图通过扩张行政权力、引入"通知—删除"规则构建起更为强有力的救济规则体系。但救济规则核心要素模糊、配套制度欠缺,所涉各方基于个体利益最大化而做出的博弈策略、行为选择将偏离救济规则的预设路径。这将引发行政权力越位,救济成本分担失衡。这需要通过细化规则内容、完善配套制度、明确各方定位、督促各方义务履行予以纠正。
A reasonable cost distribution mechanism plays a vital role in establishing an efficient patent rights protection system. The rules in revision draft of the patent law aiming at establishing a more powerful right remedy system by expanding administrative power and adding the ＂notice and take down＂rule. However, the lacking of supporting mechanism and the ambiguousness of these rules,Based on the maximization of individual interests,the game strategy and the behavior choice of the parties involved will deviate from the default path of the relief rules.Thus, the legislature should lay down detailed rules, improving the supporting system and clearing the position of the parties to encounter these problems.
出处
《科技与法律》
2017年第2期49-59,共11页
Science Technology and Law
基金
西南政法大学李雨峰教授主持的国家社科基金一般项目<知识产权行政执法机制改革研究>(16BFK139)
重庆市教委人文社科项目<重庆市云平台专利执法问题研究>(15SKG006)的阶段性成果
关键词
专利侵权
不完备法律理论
救济成本
行政执法
“通知-删除”规则
Patent infringement
The theory of incomplete law
Costs of remedying rights
Administrative enforcement of law
“Notice and take down” rule
