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新能源汽车后补贴时代政府与企业的演化博弈分析 被引量:39

Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government and Enterprise in New Energy Vehicles Market under New Subsidy Policy
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摘要 摘要:对于企业是否该承担社会责任的议题在学术界争论不休,尚未形成一致的观点,为此本文在经济全球化背景下进行研究。本文选取2014年A股上市公司为研究对象,利用因子分析、多元回归分析方法着重研究了企业社会责任行为表现的影响因素及其经济后果。研究发现:企业承担社会责任有利于企业绩效的提升。本文并对企业社会责任的管理从企业自身、政府部门和社会公众三个层面提出相应的对策,以期为政府部门的宏观经济管理和企业在新时期实施社会责任战略提供一定的决策依据。 Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper studies strategy selection mechanism between the government and the enterprise under new subsidy policy. Four game scenarios have been established, subsidy recession, increasing check frequency , increasing fines and some implicit factors. It shows that the enterprise will eventually choose to product new en- ergy vehicles, but the frequency of government inspection will affect the final behavior of the government, the lower rate may leave the government out of subsidies. The government should set reasonable subsidies and appropriate subsidy recession rate based on the actual performance of new energy vehicle market, and in the same time set up a professional inspection team to take active regulatory measures to detect fraudulent enterprises and impose higher fines can promote the new energy automotive industry healthy and rapid development. In the end, both sides of government and enterprises should attach im- portance to some implicit factors on the impact of the development of new energy vehicles market.
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第2期24-29,49,共7页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71401003) 北京市社会科学基金项目(17GLC046)
关键词 企业社会责任 企业绩效 影响因素 new energy vehicles subsidy policy government regulation evolutionary game
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