摘要
文章基于2006~2015年我国25家上市影子银行机构的微观数据,采用动态面板系统广义矩法,研究货币政策对影子银行风险承担的影响。研究发现:货币政策对我国上市影子银行机构的风险承担具有显著的影响,证明我国存在货币政策的影子银行风险承担传导渠道。宽松的货币政策,特别是价格型货币政策工具,会鼓励影子银行承担更多的风险,进而放大货币政策的扩张效应,增加金融体系的不稳定。因此,央行未来在制定货币政策时需要重视影子银行在货币政策传导中的作用,监管当局也应加强对影子银行过度风险承担行为的监管,构建有效的金融宏观审慎管理框架。
Based on the panel data of 25 shadow banks of China from 2006 to 2015,this paper examines the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of shadow banking with systemic GMM model. It finds that monetary policy has significantly positive impact on risk-taking of shadow banking. It means the shadow banking risk-taking channel really exists in China. Expansionary monetary policy,especially the price-based monetary policy will encourage shadow banking to take more risk,amplify the effect of monetary policy,and increase financial instability. Thus in the future,the conduct of monetary policy needs to adapt to changes in the transmission mechanism as shadow banking grows. Regulators need to enforce supervision of the behavior of shadow banking,restrict their excessive risk-taking behavior,and establish effective financial macro-prudential management framework.
出处
《世界经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期29-37,共9页
World Economy Studies
基金
广东省软科学研究计划项目"新常态下广东自贸区特色金融创新研究"(批准号:2016A070705016)
华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目"新常态下我国国际收支格局的变化及其对货币政策的影响研究"(项目批准号:XZD16)资助
