摘要
国有创投在实践中能否真正地发挥引导作用?现有文献对此存在广泛争议。文章首先从机理上明确了国有创投能否发挥引导作用依赖于其先行投资的试错和信号传递功能,即鉴证效应,因而其微观表现应当是投资序列中国有创投与民营创投的"先行-跟进"关系。然后,文章使用标的为非上市企业的投资序列样本,实证检验了我国国有创投的引导作用。结果显示,在投资序列中,国有创投的介入相对较晚,且国有创投以主投方式介入时,民营创投后期参与的概率会降低,这表明国有创投的引导作用尚未得到有效发挥。进一步的原因分析表明,代理问题使得国有创投投资人缺乏履行引导职能的动力,而目标管理不足和资源支持不当是导致该问题的重要管理因素。
Venture capital （VC） is a key financial strength to support mass entrepre- neurship and innovation. Chinese VC market has been rapidly growing and VC has in- creased by 21% annually since 2004. However, there are two important deficiencies in Chinese VC market： firstly, the proportion of early stage investment is relatively low; secondly, the proportion of high-tech investment is not high. The governments establish a lot of state-owned VCs, hoping to ＂crowd＂ market funds into early-stage and high-tech ventures. Currently, the proportion of direct or indirect state-owned VCs in the market is more than 30%. Regarding this background, the existence of such two deficiencies implicates that it is necessary to exam the crowding-in role of state-owned VCs. This paper firstly clarifies the intrinsic mechanism of the crowding-in role of state-owned VCs and points out that the crowding-in role of state-owned VCs lies in trial-and-error testing and signaling functions, namely certification effect, thereby leading to the leading-following relation- ship between state-owned and private VCs in investment series. Then using the data of investment series targeting Chinese unlisted ventures and based on certification theory, this paper performs a more direct examination of the crowding-in role of state-owned VCs. Results show that state-owned VCs do not play a universal crowding-in role. On one hand, state-owned VCs step in ventures＇ first round of fundraising relatively later than private VCsl on the other hand, state-owned VCs＇ previous stepping in an investment series has a negative impact on private VCs＇ subsequent participation. Principal-agent problem accounts for these results. A specific factor exploration in this paper shows that unclear orientation management and improper resource supporting strategy are part reasons for provoking agency conflict, which is meaningful for the practitioners to improve state-owned VCs management. Possible contributions of this paper are the first use of Chinese non-listed firm data to test the crowding-in role of state-owned VCs, and innovative test method, i.e. taking the impact of state-owned VCs on private VCs within investment series as key measures, which provides more robust and direct evidence for the crowding-in role of state-owned VCs.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期17-29,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(11CGL051)
关键词
国有创投
引导作用
鉴证机理
代理问题
state-owned VCs
crowding-in
certification mechanism
agency problem
