摘要
本文探讨金融抑制条件下土地金融和土地财政在我国宏观分配格局演变中的影响机理与结果。研究表明:首先,地方政府在竞争加剧的形势下会通过土地金融和土地财政控制更多的经济资源,以维持公共投资增长。其次,我国金融规模越大,对宏观分配格局的扭曲效应就越明显,居民收入占比会随之走低,企业部门和政府部门的收入比例会上升。因此地方政府通过土地财政和土地金融撬动更多经济资源的发展模式是不可持续的,应该恢复其公共部门的职能,将土地权利还给个体,将金融部门的服务重点转向实体经济。
The purpose of this study is to explore the mechanisms of how local governments＇ public investment affects macro-distribution under the pressure of competition. Methods employed are theoretical models and empirical analysis. The results are as follows：（ 1） Local governments tend to control more financial resources by land finance in order to increase public investments.（ 2） The more the finance develops,the more distorted the distribution pattern exhibits. Subsequently,the income share of the government sector and the corporate sector increases while that of the household sector decreases. The paper concludes that the growth-pattern based on land finance is unsustainable. It should restore its function as a public sector and finally return the land right to residents and shift the financial service focus to real economy.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第11期24-32,共9页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY14G030013)
浙江社科规划基金资助项目(14XH008)
浙江财经大学地方财政金融协同创新中心课题(CICLF2014005)
关键词
土地金融
土地财政
地方政府竞争
宏观分配格局
Land Finance, Land Fiscal Revenues, Local Government Competition, Macro Distribution Pattern
