摘要
将考虑谈判破裂点的Nash解作为公平参考点,构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的公平关切供应链模型,分别在批发价契约和回购契约中探讨了供应链的决策和协调问题,分析了谈判破裂点对公平关切供应链的影响.研究发现:当批发价分别为外生、内生变量时,谈判破裂点对最优订货量的影响是完全相反的.此外,在批发价契约和回购契约中,基于Stackelberg博弈的公平关切供应链均无法协调,继而文章采用价格补贴的方式进行联合契约设计使供应链达到协调.
This paper builds a supply chain model with fairness- concerns based on Stackelberg game by intro- ducing Nash bargaining solution with disagreement points as fair reference points. It discusses how disagree- ment points influence the coordination of supply chains in both the wholesale-price contract and the buy-back contract. In addition, it shows that when the wholesale price is exogenous and endogenous, the influences of disagreement points on the optimal order quantity are contrary. Finally, it is found that the supply chain can- not achieve coordination in both contracts at equilibria and that it can be coordinated if the markdown-money policies are used.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第10期92-102,共11页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601175
71571171)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-13-0538)
中国科学院青年创新促进会专项基金资助项目(2015364)
关键词
Nash讨价还价解
谈判破裂点
公平关切
供应链协调
Nash bargaining solution
disagreement point
fairness concerns
supply chain coordination
