摘要
针对电动汽车财政补贴政策的有效性问题,运用博弈论基础知识,构建政府有补贴和无补贴两种情况下的电动汽车制造商定价决策模型.在博弈中引入消费者关于电动汽车和传统汽车购买决策行为变量,分析电动汽车制造商在不同情况下的定价决策及其利润函数.研究结果表明:由于政企间信息不对称,当政府实施补贴时,电动汽车制造商的最优定价反而高于无补贴时的最优定价.基于此,提出取消补贴的普惠制、探索分摊的补贴机制、改变补贴对象和加强监管等政策建议.
Regarding to the validity of financial subsidy policy about electric vehicles （EVs）, game theory is adopted to establish the pricing-decision models of EV manufacturers under the conditions of with and without subsidy, respectively. The variable of consumers＇ purchase decision behavior about EVs and conventional vehicles is introduced in the decision models so as to analyze the pricing decisions of EV manufacturers and the profit function in different situations. The results show that the optimal pricing about EVs by manufacturers under the financial subsidy is, however, higher than that without subsidy because of the information asymmetry. To improve the effectiveness of subsidy polices, some recommendations about canceling the GSP of subsidy, exploring the sharing mechanism, changing the actors of receiving subsidy and strengthening supervision are proposed.
出处
《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第3期440-446,共7页
Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science
基金
"十二五"国家科技支撑计划(2015BAG11B01)
上海市自然科学基金(14JC1402204)
中国博士后面上基金(2015M581582)
关键词
电动汽车
政府补贴
定价
合作博弈
electric vehicle
government subsidy
pricingdecision
cooperative game
