摘要
针对我国光伏设备合作研制的问题,建立了以光伏企业、设备制造商和地方政府为博弈主体的三方演化博弈模型。通过演化稳定策略分析可知,实现更多的创新价值增值是各方主体趋于合作的基础,确定合理的利益分配比例是光伏设备合作研制成为可能的关键;与此同时,应构建惩罚机制以抑制各方主体的背叛行为,并通过政府的有效激励以降低合作研制成本。
For the cooperative development of photovoltaie equipment in China, based on replicated dynamic method of evolutionary game, we build the tripartite evolutionary game model for three game agents- photovol- taic enterprise, equipment manufacturer and local government. According to this model, we finally analyze the evolutionary stable strategies. The results prove that to achieve more innovation of value enhancement is the basis of multi-participators＇ cooperation, and to determine the reasonable profit distribution proportion is the key to make the co-development of photovoltaie equipment possible. Meanwhile, the penalty mechanism should be built to inhibit an act of betray, and the effective motivation from the government should be given to reduce the cost of co-development.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第3期100-107,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然基金项目(71173106
71673119
71573120)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2011ZDIXM057)
江苏大学高级技术人才项目(13JDG124)
关键词
光伏设备
自主创新
合作研制
多方演化博弈
photovohaic equipment
independent innovation
cooperative development
multi-person evolutionary game
