摘要
从金融稳定的角度来看,货币政策周期是非中性的。宽松的(紧缩的)货币政策促进了(降低了)商业银行的风险承担行为。本文发现,不同货币政策工具对商业银行风险承担行为的影响存在非对称性:在数量型货币工具调控的情况下,宽松货币政策对商业银行风险承担的促进作用弱于货币紧缩对商业银行风险承担的约束作用;在价格型货币工具调控的情况下,宽松货币政策对商业银行风险承担的促进作用强于货币紧缩对商业银行风险承担的约束作用。在货币政策周期中商业银行存在"估值效应"、"追逐收益效应"以及"与央行交流和沟通效应"。随着金融监管措施的改进,具有较高资本充足率的银行倾向于承担更多的风险,银行特质与风险承担逐步相匹配。此外,A股市场的繁荣会显著促进商业银行的风险承担行为。
This paper shows that monetary policy is non-neutral from the perspective of financial stability. A loose monetary policy will encourage commercial banks to take more risks, while a tight one will restrict banks＇ willingness to take risks. Different monetary policy tools have asymmetric effects on how many risks commercial banks decide to undertake： among quantitative tools, expansionary monetary poli- cies tend to encourage banks to take fewer risks than that with contractionary monetary policies; among price level targeting tools, expansionary monetary policies tend to encourage banks to take more risks than that with contractionary monetary policies. After the financial crisis in 2008, banks with higher capital ade- quacy ratios tend to take more risks, indicating that the risk-undertaking behaviors gradually matched the banks＇ capacity, and that the regulation innovations on banks were effective. Finally, we find that a booming A-share market will significantly encourage Chinese commercial banks to take risks.
作者
王晋斌
李博
Wang Jinbin Li Bo
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期25-43,共19页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
教育部基地人文社会科学重大项目(14JJD790022)的阶段性研究成果
