摘要
国际危机或国际合作中的承诺能够显示国家意图,并影响国际危机及合作的发展方向。主流研究支持"民主可信论",即民主国家的承诺更可信。但最新的定性和定量研究均对这一主张提出了挑战。文章主要基于国际危机中的承诺,梳理并评述了国家承诺可信性研究的各学派观点,指出国家承诺可信性未来的研究方向应从微观视角来研究国内各利益集团的博弈,以及从执政者对他们利益的权衡取舍出发。通过对美国和加拿大的案例考察,文章认为,国家承诺可信与否不在于国家的政权类型,而在于国家领导人为了其致胜联盟成员及其自身政治生存的利益最大化而做出的选择。
State commitments made during international crises or cooperation reveal a state's intentions,as well as influence the directions and courses of the international crises or cooperation.An influential literature in international relations argues that commitments made by democratic states crises are more credible.However,recent qualitative and quantitative research challenges this'democratic credibility theory'.This article revisits the arguments on the credibility of state commitments,focusing on commitments issued during international crises.Through case studies from the United States and Canada,it finds that the question of whether a state's commitment is credible or not is not dependent on regime type,but instead relates more closely to decisions and trade-offs made by state leadership which maximize the interests of its winning coalition and self-interest to ensure political survival.The article then explores future directions for research on state commitment credibility,arguing that micro-level analysis should consider domestic interest groups and policy makers' efforts to balance these interests.
出处
《当代亚太》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期59-94,共36页
Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies
基金
汕头大学2016年文科科研基金项目"国际承诺的可信性:一个理论分析框架"
广东省普通高校创新人才类项目"全球气候治理的有效性--一个国际国内政治互动的视角"的阶段性成果
关键词
国家承诺
信号
观众成本
“民主可信论”
致胜联盟
State Commitment
Signal
Audience Costs
'Democratic Credibility Theory'
Winning Coalition
