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BSL-2实验活动对室内环境生物污染的定量分析 被引量:3

Quantitative analysis of biological contaminants generated by a series of experiments in BSL-2 laboratory
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摘要 目的通过一系列生物安全实验室常见操作及发生意外情况产生的生物气溶胶污染进行定量研究,为实验室相关操作的风险评估和人员防护措施提供科学依据。方法用黏质沙雷菌和大肠杆菌(ATCC 13706)的噬菌体phi X-174代替有传染性的细菌、病毒,在生物安全负压室内进行多种实验操作和意外事故的模拟,通过安德森采样器定量采样法对产生的微生物气溶胶进行定量分析。结果各种实验操作中,黏质细菌产生的最大气溶胶风险是冷冻干燥粉掉落,最大浓度是11 696 cfu/m3;噬菌体产生的最大气溶胶风险是高浓度噬菌体液跌落,最大浓度是4 092 PFU/m3,产生的气溶胶粒子大部分都是可入肺即小于5μm的粒子。结论生物安全实验室内的各种实验操作和意外事故产生的气溶胶浓度差异较大,气溶胶颗粒多为可入肺粒子。定量的实验室风险研究可以更好的保障人员安全和对危险发生的应急处理。 Objective To quantify microbial aerosols contaminants generated by a series of experiments and laboratory accidents in BSL- 2 so as to use these data in risk assessment and protection for lab assistants. Methods Serratia marcescens and Phage phi X 174 of Escherichia coli 13 706 were used to replace the infectious microorganism. A series of experiments had been designed to mimic potential accident cases and quantify microbial aerosols by quantitative air sampling. Results The accident scenarios generating the highest aerosol concentrations were dropping freeze drying bacterial powder and dropping a bottle of phage liquid. The highest intensities of aerosol were 11 696 cfu / m^3,4 092 PFU/m^3 respectively. Many of these experiments generated low particle size aerosols,which would be inhaled into the lungs of laboratory staff. Conclusion The intensity of the microbiological aerosol generated by these experiments varies widely and most of the generated aerosols particles are smaller than 5 micron( which can deposit in lungs). Quantitative risk assessment data can aid the protection of laboratory staff and the response to laboratory accidents.
出处 《中国消毒学杂志》 CAS 北大核心 2016年第10期951-954,957,共5页 Chinese Journal of Disinfection
基金 国家863计划课题(2014AA021404) 国家传染病防治重大专项(2012ZX10004402)
关键词 微生物气溶胶 气溶胶颗粒 风险评估 BSL-2 microbiological aerosol aerosol particulate risk assessment BSL-2
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