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股票质押式回购业务运行现状、集中度风险及对策——基于供给侧改革视角的分析 被引量:20

The Operation of Stock Pledged Repo, Concentration Risks and Solutions, From the Supply Side Reform Perspective
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摘要 股票质押式回购运行现状体现了"降成本、去杠杆"的供给侧改革任务,不断降低的质押利率降低了上市公司的融资成本;以流通股质押为主、差异化管理质押率并控制限售股质押率,控制了杠杆率;集中度风险分析显示估值越高、大股东持股比例越高的上市公司越倾向于提高集中度实现质押融资,后期建议证券公司质押业务去产能,限制对两高一剩行业的融资,严格控制质押集中度,并建立全面严格的尽职调查机制,确保业务稳定发展。 The operational status of Stock pledged repo reflects the task of supply side reform, to reduce cost and decrease deleverage. The continuously decreasing pledge rate reduced the financing cost of listed companies. Three different measures such as tradable shares as the main target of the pledge, different management pledge rate as well as the control on pledge rate of restricted stock effectively controlled the levels of leverage. The analysis on Concentration risk shows that the higher the valuation of listed companies and the proportion of major shareholders, the higher the degree of concentration to achieve the pledge financing. This paper recommends securities companies should control the financing on companies in the industry of high pollution, high energy consumption and overcapacity, and cuts stock pledged repo on excess production capacity industry; strictly control the pledge concentration, and establish a comprehensive and strict due diligence mechanism to ensure the steady development of business.
作者 高伟生
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第9期51-57,共7页 Securities Market Herald
关键词 股票质押式回购 供给侧改革 集中度风险 stock pledged repo, supply-side reform, concentration risk
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