摘要
我国进行国有企业的股份化改革以来 ,企业要求经营者持股及股票期权的呼声很高 ,从迄今为止的实际进展看 ,尚缺乏明晰的理论指导。文章以委托代理理论为基础 ,将所有者和经营者在选择是否激励和是否努力时的行为视为一个双方博弈的过程 ,通过博弈模型的分析认为 :经理股票期权作为一种长期的股权激励方式 ,将促使理智的所有者和经营者达到 (激励 ,努力 )的纳什均衡 ,以达到双方效用的最大化 ,从而有效降低企业委托代理成本 ,解决现代公司制度中的“代理人问题”。
After reform of state -owned firms mechanism, many companies appeal for ESO, but there have not been any clear theories for operation in practice until now. On the basis of principal-agent theory of the firm, this paper regards owners and managers as the two sides to game and builds the game model which analyses the behaviors of owners and managers. As a long-term stock based incentive system, ESO will align the goal of owners and managers and make them reach Nash Equilibrium to maximize their utility, and lower agency cost to solve the agency problem in modern firms.
出处
《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第3期138-141,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University
