摘要
我国地方政府债务近几年来的迅速增长引起学界、业界及政策制定者的关注及担忧。但对该问题的决定因素及形成机制,目前鲜有经济学文献加以严谨研究。文章认为该问题与1994年分税制改革后地方政府面临的财政压力及制度约束直接相关。基于地级市数据,我们发现各地区债务规模显著受到其财政缺口的影响:财政缺口每增加1%,融资平台数量增加的可能性将提高14%,债务规模将增加0.2%。基于文中建立的实证模型,我们预测我国地方债务在未来五年的年均增长率为16%,到2017年其总额将达到该年GDP的42%。债务总体上仍处于可控范围之内。结合中央政府近期"营改增"及加强预算外资金管理的一系列改革措施,文章认为在财政集权的大趋势下,预算内财政缺口或预算外收入支配力下降会导致地方政府负债动力的进一步增强。对此,政策制定者应予以充分的预期及重视。
Chinese local government debt has experienced rapid growth in recent years, which has raised con- cerns for scholars and policymakers. However, serious research on its determinants and mechanism can rarely found. The paper attempts to fill this gap by empirically examining the effects of the 1994 Chinese tax reform on local debt. We argue that huge debt is the outcome of the fiscal pressures the current tax system exerts on local governments. Empirical evidence shows that 1% increase in fiscal gap leads to an increase of 14% in the prob- ability of establishing local government investment platforms, and increase of 0.2% in debt size. We predict the size of local debt in 2017 will account for around 42% of the year. Finally, according to our argument, the incentive of local government to increase debt is still high, given the trend of fiscal centralization.
出处
《经济社会体制比较》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期45-57,共13页
Comparative Economic & Social Systems
基金
复旦大学卓学计划科研资助(项目编号:JJH3246048)
关键词
地方债
分税制改革
地方融资平台
财政压力
Local Debt
Tax- sharing Reform
Local Government Investment Platform
Fiscal Gap
