摘要
针对中国愈演愈烈的企业高管腐败现象,本文以2004—2013年出现高管腐败案件的上市公司为样本,从外部治理约束的角度,探讨外部治理要素对高管腐败产生的效应。研究结果表明:(1)债务约束能够对企业的高管腐败行为起到明显的抑制作用。短期债务比例越高、债务规模越大,就越能有效地降低高管腐败事件的发生率;(2)产品市场竞争与高管腐败之间呈显著负相关关系,来自产品市场竞争的压力能够有效约束企业高管的腐败行为;(3)目前中国经理人市场竞争对国有企业来说表现失灵,未能对其高管腐败行为产生显著制约作用。而对于非国有企业,经理人市场竞争表现出良好的治理作用,能够显著降低发生高管腐败的可能性;(4)在制约高管腐败行为方面,法律环境并没有显现出预期中的治理效果。
In view of the intensified corruption of corporate executives, this paper explores the effects of external governance factors on executive corruption from the perspective of external governance constraints, using the listed companies as samples from 2004 to 2013. The results show that： （ 1 ）the debt has an obvious constrained influence on corporate execu- tives＇ corrupt behaviors. The ratio of short-term debt is higher and the scale debt is greater, the effect of reducing executive corruption incidence is more effective;（2 ）there is a significant ket competition and executive corruption,which shows that the negative correlation relationship between the product marpressure of the product market competition can effectively restrain executives corruption;（3 ）the managers market competition has no significant constrained influence on executive corruption of state-owned enterprises. However, regarding to non state-owned enterprises, the managers market competition has an constrained influence on reducing the corrupt behaviors of corporate executives ; （4） the legal environment did not show the expected effect on restricting executives corruption .
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期30-39,共10页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目“中国企业管理会计理论与方法研究”(71032006)
国家自然科学基金项目“分布式数据一致性与XBRL网络财务报告质量控制”(71171097)
暨南大学企业发展研究所重大项目“企业转型中的战略成本管理研究”(2014ZD001)
关键词
高管腐败
公司治理
债务约束
市场竞争
治理环境
executive corruption
corporate governance
debt constraint
market competition
governance environment
