摘要
胡塞尔在《观念Ⅱ》中一方面延续《观念Ⅰ》的观点,坚称就超越论还原而言,纯粹自我作为自我结构的核,是空乏的极点、功能中心;但另一方面,他从人格自我的构造分析出发,指出纯粹自我是习性的基底,并因此而蕴含个体的历史。从纯粹自我这两方面的表面紧张关系出发,依据《观念Ⅱ》文本中对纯粹自我和人格自我的构造分析,纯粹自我的独特把握方式和人格自我的关联可得以澄清。在《观念Ⅱ》中,胡塞尔虽然缺乏从内时间意识中滞留的双重意向性出发的明确的发生现象学立场,但是依赖于人格自我构造分析中对人格自我的双重性以及两种历史性的区分,可初步揭示纯粹自我所蕴含的习性。
In Ideas Ⅱ, on one hand, Husserl insists that, in terms of transcendental reduction, as the nucleus of ego structure, pure ego is the pole of emptiness and the functional center. On the other hand,starting from the constitutional analysis of personal ego, he points out that the pure ego is the bearer of habitus, which contains the history of the individual. Beginning with the tension of the two aspects of pure ego, this paper indicates the intimate relation of pure ego and personal ego on the basis of the constitutional analysis of the pure ego and personal ego in Ideas Ⅱ. It also points out that in the Ideas Ⅱ,since Husserl lacks genetic phenomenology standpoint obtained from double intentionality of the retention in inner time-consciousness, he can only rely on personal ego constitutional analysis to reveal the habitus contained by pure ego by clarifying two dimensions of personal ego and two different kinds of historicity.
出处
《哲学分析》
2014年第6期34-43,共10页
Philosophical Analysis
