摘要
分析了一种无证书代理签名方案,指出其针对于无证书密码系统中的两类敌手都不安全。类型I敌手可替换用户的公钥来伪造代理授权和代理签名;类型II敌手(KGC)可针对预先选择好的用户生成特殊的系统参数,然后伪造代理授权。为了克服这些安全问题,提出了一种改进的方案,分析表明,新方案具有更好的安全性。
This paper analyzes a certificateless proxy signature scheme and points out it are vulnerable against two types of adversaries in certificateless cryptosystems. Type I adversary can replace the user’public key to forge proxy delega-tions from any original signer to any proxy signer and compute the proxy signature;type II adversary（KGC）can generate the trapdoor system parameters according to the identity information of a pre-selected target user and then forge the proxy delegations from the target user to other users. To overcome these security problems, a new improved proxy signature scheme is proposed. Analysis shows that the new scheme has better security.
出处
《计算机工程与应用》
CSCD
2014年第22期115-117,140,共4页
Computer Engineering and Applications
基金
国家自然科学基金(No.61173190
No.61273311)
陕西省自然科学基础资助项目(No.2010JQ8027)
陕西省教育厅科研计划项目(No.2010JK398
No.12JK1003)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目(No.GK201002041)
陕西师范大学研究生培养创新基金(No.2013CXS024)
关键词
无证书签名
代理签名
公钥替换攻击
恶意的KGC攻击
双线性对
certificateless signature
proxy signature
public key replacement attacks
malicious KGC attacks
bilinear mapping
