摘要
首先对黄土高原治理的博弈结构进行了辨析 ,其次对计划经济和市场条件下水土治理中中央、地方和农户之间的博弈均衡进行了实证分析。结果显示 。
Based on the framework of game theory the behaviors of the central government, local governments and farmers in management of the loess plateau in different periods are qualitatively analyzed, and the corresponding eqillibria and payoffs of the respective players for each game are given. It indicates that government directed management project just has a low efficiency.
出处
《水土保持通报》
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第3期35-38,共4页
Bulletin of Soil and Water Conservation
基金
国家社会科学基金资助 (99CJY0 0 8)
西北大学自然科学基金
