摘要
运用经济博弈论分析考试作弊现象 ,建立作弊者与监督者的混合战略博弈模型和绩优生与绩差生的不完美信息静态博弈模型 .以成本—收益分析 ,得出一些有益的结论并提出相应的解决办法 .
By applying economic game theory to the cheating appearances in the examination,We built a mixed strategy equilibrium model between the cheater and the monitor and a static game model of imperfect information between the good students and bad ones.By the cost-benefit analysis,we also drew out some beneficial conclusions and gave the solving measures.
出处
《山东师范大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2002年第2期13-16,共4页
Journal of Shandong Normal University(Natural Science)
