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信用、信息与规制——守信/失信的经济学分析 被引量：51

Credit,Information and Regulation:Economics Analysis to Keep Faith and Break Faith
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摘要 本文针对中国现实经济中的广泛存在的失信现象 ,从经济学特别是信息经济学的角度 ,分析了信用的性质 ,失信的种类与原因 ,防止失信的市场机制与政府规制。本文的主要观点是 ,从信息的角度分析信用问题是个很好的视角。 Focusing on the normal phenomenon of breaking faith in China's current economy, this essay analyzed the nature of the credit, the causes and the kinds of breaking faith, the market mechanism against breaking faith and the government regulation for it, from the economics especially information economics aspect. The main standpoint of this essay is that it is a very good angle of view to analyzed credit from information.
作者 于立 于左 丁宁
机构地区 东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2002年第6期65-70,共6页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金 辽宁大学经济体制比较研究中心资助
关键词 信息不对称 信用机制 信用机制 中国 市场机制 政府规制 信息经济学 credit information credit mechanism credit regulation
分类号 F062.5 [经济管理—政治经济学] F832.4 [经济管理—金融学]
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参考文献14

  • 1张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础[J].经济研究,2002,37(1):3-13. 被引量：838
  • 2钱颖一.市场与法治[J].经济社会体制比较,2000(3):1-11. 被引量：260
  • 3Daniel R. Fusfeld, 1990, The Age of the Economist, Scott, Foresman and Company.
  • 4George Akerlof, 1970, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • 5Lan Molho,1997, The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organization,Blaekwell Publishers.
  • 6D. Sappington, 1991, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2.
  • 7Charles K Wilber, 1998, Economics, Ethics, and Public Policy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  • 8Steven Tadelis, 1999, What's in a name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset, American Economic Review.
  • 9James Mirrlees, 1975, The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior: Part I, Mimemeo, Nuffield College,Oxford Univesity.
  • 10R. Myerson, 1979, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, Eeonometrica.

二级参考文献20

  • 1.《经济学家看法律、文化与历史》[A].张维迎.《产权、政府与信誉》[C].北京三联书店,2001..
  • 2Greif,Avner ,1996,"Contracing,Enforcement and Efficiency:Economics Beyond Law",the Paper for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics,World Bank,April 25-26,1996,Washington,D.C.
  • 3Green,E.and R.Porter,1984."Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information",Econometrica,52:87-100.
  • 4Huang,and Wu,Ho-Mou,1994,"More Order without More Law:A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Culture",Journal of Law,Economics and Organization.
  • 5Kreps,David,1990,"Corpocate Culture and Economic Theory",In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy,edited by James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,90-143.
  • 6Macaulay ,Stewart,1985,"An Empirical View of Contract",Wisconsin Law Review,1985(3):465-82.
  • 7Macneil ,Ian R.1985,"Relational Contract:What We Do and We Do Not Know",Wisconsin Law Review,1985(3):482-524.
  • 8Merry,Sally Engle,1984,"Rethinking Gossip and Scandal",in Donald Black(ed.)Toward a General Theory of Social Control,New York:Academic Press.
  • 9Milgrom ,Paul,Douglas North and Barry Weingast ,1990,"The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:The Law Mechant,Private Judges,and the Champagne Fairs",Economics and Politics 2:1-23.
  • 10Shearmur,Jeremy and Daniel B.Klein,1997,"Good Conduct in the Great Society:Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation",in Daniel B.Klein(ed.)Reputation,The University of Michigan Press.

共引文献1095

同被引文献559

引证文献51

二级引证文献252

中国工业经济
2002年 第6期

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