摘要
目前电力市场中的系统边际价格拍卖与报价价格拍卖都不能有效解决不正当市场竞争引起的电价飞升问题。文中给出了设计抑制电价飞升拍卖机制的原则 ,提出了一种能有效抑制物理持留和经济持留的系统边际价格与报价价格混合拍卖机制。在电价超过高价市场启动价格后 ,根据卖电商是否拥有系统价格权以及报价是否不利于缓解电力供需矛盾 ,执行系统边际价格或报价价格两种电价之一 ,从而加强对卖电商报低电价、减少持留的经济激励 ,可以有效地限制市场势力 ,抑制电价飞升。提出多价格限机制限制强市场势力 ,对不同类卖电商采用不同的价格限 ,使各类卖电商都能获取正当范围内的稀缺租金 ,改善市场结构 。
Neither system-marginal-price auction nor pay-as-bid auction can suppress price spikes. In this paper, a new auction mechanism that hybridizes system-marginal-price auction and pay-as-bid auction is proposed. When system marginal rice exceeds a threshold price, hybrid auction for high-price electricity market starts. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at system marginal price or their own bid price, depending on whether they have a right for system marginal price and their offers are harmful to suppressing price spikes. Such economic stimuli encourage sellers not to practice economic withholding and physical withholding, so that market power and price spikes are suppressed. Instead of a single price cap, multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. Different types of plants are given different price caps, so that they all can get appropriate scarcity rents. And this will benefit the changes in market structure and the long-term development of power system.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第9期30-35,共6页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
