摘要
建立了发电市场迭代竞价模型。该模型在竞价过程中给出了充分的市场信息 ,发电商可以合理、经济地组织生产 ,确定竞标策略。电力购买者赋予了议价能力 ,协调各厂商竞价 ,促使市场高效地运作。实例模拟表明 ,在完全竞争的市场环境下 ,各厂商的发电资源可以得到充分利用 ,市场处于Nash均衡 ,出清价收敛于传统的系统边际成本附近 ,发电系统接近于经济运行状态。比较了迭代竞价机制与单轮投标机制的市场效率。模拟了发电商串通行为的形成 ,为此有必要制定有效的规则对市场竞价加以约束。
An iterative competitive bidding m echanism in generation market is proposed.With sufficientinformation from this mechanism ,power producers can optimize bidding strategies according to costs.Market operator is licensed to negotiate, which brings out an efficient m arket by coordinating bidding.Sim ulation result shows,in a perfect com petitive market,all producers can utilize their units efficiently;clearing price m aintains a reasonable level;market arrives at Nash equilibrium; the whole system operates econom ically.In addition,iterative com petitive bidding is also an efficient model to analyze the market perform ance.Collusion is figured out,that indicates the necessity of m arket regulation.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第9期1-6,共6页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目 (5 993715 0 )
关键词
发电市场
迭代竞价机制
竞价策略
NASH均衡
电力工业
electricity market
com petitive bidding mechanism
competitive bidding strategies
Nash equilibrium
collusion
