摘要
198 7年 ,美国 35个州不顾联邦最高法院的裁定 ,再次纷纷颁布了反收购立法 ,对公司内以管理者为代表的利益相关者和股东之间的关系给予了制度性地重新确认 ,标志着美国公司治理结构制度安排内重大创新的发生。从经济学的角度对这一变迁过程进行分析 ,表明是人力资本的专用性使利益相关者承担了原有制度安排下的外部成本 ,而寻求对不能内化于制度的成本的补偿构成了此次创新的动因。提出美国公司治理结构的制度创新对我国公司治理结构建设的启示。
In 1987, 35 states in the US re-enacted the anti-takeover laws regardless of the verdict made by the Supreme Court. This activity conducted the re-establishment of the relationship between the management and the shareholders within a company, initiating a great institutional innovation on American corporate management structure. An economic analysis on the evolution process indicates that the uniqueness of human capital renders the related parties to undertake the external costs. Meanwhile, the motivation for the innovation lies in the attempt to seek a compensation for the costs which cannot be found within the system.
出处
《经济经纬》
北大核心
2002年第2期31-34,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
公司治理结构
制度创新
制度变迁
美国
反收购
立法
corporate management structure
institutional innovation
institutional evolution
