摘要
银行监管原本是央行的传统职能 ,但近年来的国际趋势是 ,此职能已逐步从央行的手中分离出来 ,被授予另一个独立的超级统一监管机构。本文首先试图详细剖析这种变迁的历史背景和种种原因 ,指出其意义深远 ,从成效、成本、监管对象和公众反应等方面考虑 ,将影响监管的素质和效率。其次 ,从理论和逻辑的角度出发 ,本文分别阐明支持和反对央行职能分离的论据 ,并介绍实证研究的相关结论。之后 ,将讨论延伸到发展中国家 ,探讨走向独立于央行的统一监管架构不适用于发展中国家的主要原因 ,并以委内瑞拉为案例总结其银行监管失败的经验和教训。最后 ,结合我国的国情 ,指出正在酝酿中的银行监察局应设在人民银行内部 ,应充分利用人民银行目前的人才和资金优势。
Banking supervision was traditionally undertaken in-house in the Central Bank, but the recent international trend appears to suggest that this function has been removed and put under a separate specialized supervisory institution, known as a mega regulator. This paper attempts to search for the underlying historical background and various reasons for such a separation. It points out that this change is not a minor administrative reshuffle, as it will inevitable affect the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision in almost all areas. From a theoretical and logical perspective, arguments for and against separation are presented, which are also compared with limited empirical evidences. Then the discussion extends to the developing countries where reasons why this mega regulator model is not suitable are sought. As a case study, the Venezuela banking structure before its banking crises of 1994 is analyzed and useful lessons are drawn. Finally, with the proposal of establishing a mega regulator in China----the Financial Supervisory Authority, this paper argues that the supervisory body should be under the wing of the People's Bank of China, at least for the present moment, because of its incomparable advantages in talent(including necessary caliber and professional skills) and funding.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第12期1-12,共12页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
金融监管
组织架构
职能分离
货币政策
“双峰”论
监管信息
financial supervision, separation from the central bank, mega regulator, macro-economic policy micro-supervision information, 'twin peak' theory
