摘要
首先阐述了无差别产品的价格决策博弈均衡模式 ,指出了纳什均衡对厂商本身并无实际意义 ,厂商应以降低边际成本为基础来降低价格才能扩大市场份额 .其次阐述了差别产品的价格决策博弈均衡模式 ,指出了产品差别确定了市场份额 ,只有在一次博弈中厂商理性不完全时才可能引发价格战 ,而在重复博弈中由于存在报复机制 ,厂商的理性选择是合作 .现实中的价格战除了厂商理性有限外 。
The first part of the essay is the explanation of the equilibrium patterns of countermeasure in setting the price of products without differentiation, pointing out that Nash equilibrium is of no importance to factory owners, who should reduce marginal cost so as to enlarge market share. The second part is the explanation of the equilibrium patterns of countermeasure in fixing the price of products with differentiation, showing it is the difference of products that makes the market share. Only when a rational choice by a factory owner is incomplete can a price war breaks out. Because of the existence of retaliatory system, the rational choice could be nothing but cooperation. In reality, in addition to the limit of rational choice, it is the systematic reason that really counts.
出处
《中南民族学院学报（自然科学版）》
2001年第4期81-84,共4页
Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities(Natural Sciences)
