摘要
与主银行制度相比，风险投资是一种市场化程度更高的关系型融资制度，其在企业的治理结构中发挥着特殊的作用。风险投资者进行关系型融资的根本目的不是为了获得赫尔曼等人所说的金融约束和政策设定的相机性租金。而以有限合伙制为代表的美国风险投资业之所以成功就在于它们是自主经营、自主决策、自担风险的经济实体 ,并且由于合伙公司有效的契约安排和组织自身的结构特性，风险投资家有充分的动力，耗费大量的时间和精力去监控被投资企业。
Compared with the main bank system, venture capital is a new relational financing system with high degree of market－ oriented factors, which exerts special effects on the governance structure of the enterprise. Limited partnership characterizes the industry of venture capital in US, whose success is attributed to economic entity of self－ management, self－ determination and bearing risk by themselves. Due to the characters of the effective covenant and organizing structure, venture capitalists have sufficient motivation to spend large energy and time to monitor the venture enterprise.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第4期46-51,共6页
China Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金!(99BJY060)
