摘要
激励、监控与报酬契约直接影响着企业的经营业绩，但在信息不对称下，它们的关系非常复杂。文章力图通过建立一个数学模型将报酬契约与代理人的风险厌恶、环境风险、产出分享份额、监控信号等联系起来，以探讨如何将激励机制与监控机制同时纳人报酬合同的设计中。通过该模型所得出的几个结论有助于从另一个角度去设计和改进现行的报酬激励机制。
Incentive, monitoring and compensation contracts directly affect performance of enterprises, but they have very complex interactions under the circumstance of asymmetric information. This paper tries to construct a mathematical model to demonstrate the relationship between the compensation contract and risk aversion of agents, environment risk, output sharing and monitoring signal in order to explore how to include both incentive and monitoring mechanisms into compensation contract. Several results obtained from this model could be used to assist the designing and improving of current incentive contracts.
出处
《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第2期119-125,共7页
Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)
基金
此文是国家自然科学基金资助项目(79870053)的阶段性成果之一。
