摘要
引论:J.Cohen归纳概率逻辑批判1979—1991 在文献[1]、[3]、[4]中,J.Cohen试图拓广Bacon和Mill的排斥归纳法,在相关变量法的基础上提出和论证了归纳支持句法和归纳概率句法,并将上述句法在模态逻辑S_4的框架内表述,完整地构造Non-Pascalian归纳概率逻辑。从1979年Levi在文献[7]中首次对CIL作系统的研究,直到1991年文献[12]的发表。
In this paper, the main criticisms about J. Cohen's inductive logic (CIL), offered by I. Levi, M. Hesse, L. Mackie and R. Hilpinen, are analyzed. It is shown that all of them have not given correct assertions about the global properties of CIL's. This paper proves that, because the semantic structures of two-valued logic and modal logic S4 are not compatible with the relevant variable method (RVM), the syntaxes of inductive support and inductive probability, CIL is not consistent. Further, the logic structure of Von Frisch's experimental inferences and eliminative induction is analyzed. It shows that RVM is inadequate for describing the experimental inferences based on eliminative induction. Hence, CIL is not adequate too.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
1992年第5期1-9,共9页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家青年社科基金"实验推理研究"
