摘要
针对由公平中性盟主和公平关切盟员构成的虚拟企业,研究在考虑道德风险和盟员公平关切系数非对称情况下盟主对盟员的激励机制设计问题.结合委托代理理论,为盟主制定契约来激励盟员努力工作并甄别其公平关切程度.进而分析契约并与公平关切系数对称的情形对比.结果表明,当盟主不了解盟员的公平关切系数时,盟主期望利润下降,而拥有私有信息的盟员的努力程度降低且收益增加.这一结果体现了信息的价值,对虚拟企业的运营实践具有重要指导意义.
For the virtual enterprise （VE） with a fairness neutral owner and a fairness concern partner, this paper investigates the incentive mechanism between the owner and the partner under moral hazard and asymmetric fairness concern factor. Incorporating principal-agent theory, the contract that the owner uses to motivate the partner and screen its true fairness concern factor is designed. Furthermore, the corresponding optimal contract is analyzed and compared with the symmetric scenario. The comparison results show that when the owner is uncertain about the partner＇s fairness concern factor, its expected profit decreases while the partner with private information exerts less effort but obtains higher income, which implies the value of information and is valuable to the operation of VE.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第3期315-323,共9页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71325002
61225012)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071028
70931001
710210 61)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20120042130003
20110042110024)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N110204003
N120104001)
流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室基础科研业务费资助项目(2013ZCX11)
关键词
虚拟企业
激励机制
公平关切
信息非对称
委托代理
virtual enterprise
incentive mechanism
fairness concern
asymmetric information
principal-agent
