摘要
通过构建台湾农业企业与台湾农业管理机构之间的完全信息静态博弈模型,发现台湾农业企业到大陆进行投资概率的大小并不是受企业的收益影响,收益的提高不一定会增加台湾农业管理机构开放政策允许企业到大陆投资的概率,提出优化闽台农业科技合作体系和增强投资软环境优势的对策。
By building the static game model of perfect information between Taiwan agro-businesses and Taiwan agricultural management institutions,this paper finds that the probability of investment in Chinese Mainland by Taiwan agro-businesses is not affected by the revenues of the agro-businesses and the revenue increase of Taiwan agricultural management institutions does not necessarily increase the probability of the opening policy of the institutions for allowing Taiwan agro-businesses to invest in Chinese Mainland.The paper puts forward the countermeasures including optimizing the system of agricultural sic-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan and strengthening the advantages of soft investment environment in Fujian.
出处
《台湾农业探索》
2014年第2期6-9,共4页
Taiwan Agricultural Research
基金
全国大学生创新训练项目(201310389032)
福建省大学生创新训练项目(111zc3085)
关键词
闽台
农业科技合作
台湾农业企业
台湾农业管理机构
博弈模型
Fujian and Taiwan
agricultural scio-tech cooperation
Taiwan agro-business
Taiwan management organizations
game model
