摘要
本文将上市公司大股东增持行为包含信息区分为作用相反的两方面:一方面,大股东增持向市场传递公司所在行业的发展优势,对行业内其他公司带来正向溢出效应;另一方面,大股东增持传递出本公司特有发展优势,对行业内其他公司带来负向溢出效应。通过发展传统的信号传递模型,本文从理论上分析增持行为的信号传递如何引发大股东行为的策略性博弈,同时引入空间计量模型旨在实证上区分这两种截然不同的信息含义。经验证据表明,大股东增持行为不仅能够传递行业内个别企业的优势,更主要是传递行业整体优势或劣势。
We argue that the information communicated by large shareholders in purchasing or selling off their shares may have two distinct spillover effects ： First, large shareholders may increase their holdings to signal positive growth prospect or valuation advantage of the whole industry, thus enhancing the rival firms＇ valuation in the same industry. On the other hand, such positive prospect is only firm- specific, thus bringing negative effect on the other firms＇ valuation. We develop a signaling model to show the strategic interaction of large shareholders＇ behaviors induced by the signaling spillover effects. This article also contributes to the literature by introducing the spatial econometric model to empirically distinguish between the two conflicting spillover effects. The empirical evidence robustly supports the ＂positive spillover hypothesis＂, suggesting that prospect rather than firm -specific valuation. the signaled information is relevant to industry-specific
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期107-115,共9页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
关键词
大股东增持
信号传递溢出效应
空间面板模型
Holdings of major shareholders
Signaling model
Spillover effect
Spatial panel model
