摘要
传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为,概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础,感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而,具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制:感知表征加工与身体经验相关的具体知识,抽象符号表征加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制,证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。
The symbolic-computational theories have proposed that our concepts are couched in amodal representations. On the tradi- tional view, conceptual representations are abstract symbols which do not have any connections with perception systems. This orthodoxy has been challenged by the theories of embodied cognition. According to embodied cognition, cognition is essentially embodied and the body plays a pivotal role in an organism＇s cognitive processes. The embodied theories of conceptual representations hold that a conceptu- al representation is grounded in the same neural systems that govern the sensation, perception and action. Therefore, concepts are es- sentially neural recordings during perceptual and motor experiences, and these recordings can later be re-enacted as the way of concep- tual processing. A number of studies focusing on the emergence of perceptual phenomena in conceptual processing and the effect of body changes on conceptual processing support the notion that perceptual systems are central to conceptual representations. A common issue about perceptually conceptual representations is that they seem ill-suited for representing abstract concepts. In order to support the embodied assumption, some researchers identify several possible means by which perceptual systems might handle abstract ideas. Those include situation experiences hypothesis and metaphorical projection. The former proposes that extensive perceptual information about background situations is preserved in the process of representing abstract concepts and is stored in the long-term memory. The latter proposes that sensorimotor experiences serve as the foundation for the development of more abstract concepts and the sen- sorimotor information should be an integral part for representing abstract concepts. However, both approaches are not enough to represent the essential and whole meaning of an abstract concept. This threat to perceptual representation implies that our conceptual system may employ amodal symbols positioned to handle abstract concepts. A powerful and fully functional conceptual system should have multiple representational processing, one involving perceptual system that are suited for bearing perceptually derived contents and the other involving abstract symbols that are suited for beating ab- stract contents. Researchers in the cognitive sciences have gathered sufficient empirical evidence for representation distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, which supports the representational pluralism assumption. The pathology literature suggests that patients can be selectively impaired for concrete concepts or abstract concepts. The evidence from the functional brain imaging studies and event-related potentials supports that different patterns of activation are associated with the processing of concrete and abstract concepts. Behavioral studies employing diverse tasks support the notion that different cognitive systems are associated with the different kinds of concepts. Also many theories, such as the Dual Code Theory, Words as Tools Theory and Symbol Interdependency Theory, are in accordance with the assumption of the representational pluralism. All these studies show that some of our concepts are couched in perceptual codes and some are couched in abstract symbols. Many questions remain, and further research is needed to resolve conflicting results derived from studies employing distinct experimental paradigms and techniques. Current evidence from cognitive neuroscience does not provide us an unequivocal picture of how the different concepts are represented in the brain. Another further problem with the appeal to representational pluralism is that it faces the same challenges that amodal symbol theory faces. There are some disparate views about the existence of amodal symbols. The interrelation between different representational mechanisms should also be investigated in future research.
出处
《心理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第2期483-489,共7页
Journal of Psychological Science
基金
"打造理论粤军"2013重大项目(LLYJ1323)的资助
关键词
概念表征
具身认知
抽象符号
多元表征
conceptual representation, embodied cognition, abstract symbols, representational pluralism
