摘要
文章讨论如何设置银行的惩罚力度将银行与借款人、借款人与借款人之间的博弈整合为联保贷款小组成员之间的博弈,并分析了个体加入联保贷款小组及其偿还贷款影响因素。研究发现:申请联保贷款的借款人会选择与风险型相同的借款人一组;针对不同联保贷款小组应计算其合适的贷款利率,不应采用一刀切的贷款利率;银行设置的惩罚力度达到一定程度时能消除借款人的主观违约意愿。
This paper analyzes how banks could set up the bank’s punishment to transform the traditional loan-repayment games between banks and the borrower into games between the borrower and the borrow-er ,show s the individual joins its team of group lending and factors affecting the loan repayment .Study found that ：borrowers applying for group lending would group with a same risk type borrower ;group lending for different teams should calculate the appropriate lending rates ,lending rates should not be used across the board ;the degree of punishment to a certain extent can eliminate borrower’s subjective defaul-ting w illing ness .
出处
《西安财经学院学报》
CSSCI
2014年第2期20-25,共6页
Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70963011)
关键词
联保贷款
借款人违约
银行的惩罚力度
group lending
borrower default
degree of banks’ punishment
