摘要
从寻租视角,基于一系列基本假设,构建了上市公司与监管部门的不完全信息动态博弈模型;通过对模型均衡结果的讨论,分析了博弈双方的最优策略,进而提出减少欺诈上市寻租发生的措施和建议。
From the angle of rent-seeking, based on a series of basic suppositions, this paper constructs incomplete information dynamic game model between listed companies and their supervising departments, after the discussing of the equilibrium results of the model, analyzes the optimal strategy of the two parties of the game, and furthermore points out the measures and suggestions for the reduction of the cheating and rent-seeking of the initial public offering of Chinese companies.
出处
《重庆工商大学学报（自然科学版）》
2014年第1期46-52,共7页
Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:Natural Science Edition
基金
安徽省软科学研究项目(1302053037)
安徽省高校人文社科重点研究基地农科教中心重点项目(SK2013A064)
关键词
上市公司
IPO
寻租
博弈
listed company
IPO
rent-seeking
game
