摘要
以1999—2008年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，采用加权最小二乘法和动态面板数据的系统广义矩法从制度背景、公司经营特征、董事会的监督职能和总经理的影响力四个角度综合研究董事会规模和结构的影响因素。研究证实，中国不存在适合所有公司的最优董事会规模和结构；《指导意见》的颁布导致董事会规模和独立性经历了先上升后下降的倒U型轨迹；董事会规模和结构与公司生产范围和经营复杂性以及董事会的监督需求正相关，与股东对管理层的监督程度、公司外界经营环境造成的监督成本负相关，最终控制人为国有性质的公司董事会规模更大、结构更不独立。
This paper analyzes determinants of board size and composition. The conclusion is that there is no best board size and composition which suits all listed companies, board size and composition shows an inverse U-shaped curve because of ＂Estabhshment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding Opinion＂. Firms with large asset, operating complexity and high demand for board＇s monitoring responsibility tend to have larger and more independent board while companies＇ greater monitoring cost leads to smaller and less independent board. State-owned enterprises tend to have larger board size but less independent boards.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期90-100,共11页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金"证券分析师托市行为
投资者反应与上市公司融资策略"(71262005)
博士后基金"分析师特征
现金流预测与市场反应"(2013M540352)
