摘要
如何有效监督和防范寻租行为是政府采购领域中的热点话题.从政府和采购人员成本收益角度分析,分别构建完全信息下政府与采购人员的单阶段和重复博弈模型,探讨了政府采购监督效率的影响因素和最优决策方案.结果表明:除稽查成本和效益外,租金额度、采购人员风险偏好以及采购人员素质等因素也会影响政府决策;政府惩罚力度、采购人员寻租成本以及社会环境则会影响采购人员的寻租行为.
How to supervise and prevent rent-seeking effectively is a hot issue in the field of government procure-ment .The complete information game models of one stage and repeated stage are built in this article and the fac-tors of efficiency in government procurement and the optimal decisions are given .The result shows that rent quo-ta, risk preference and quality of buyers also influence the quality of government decision -making besides audi-ting costs and efficiency;the government penalties , opportunity cost of rent-seeking and social environment have an important impact on buyers′behavior of rent-seeking .
出处
《江苏科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2013年第6期608-612,共5页
Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371088)
关键词
政府采购
寻租
收益矩阵
博弈分析
government procurement
rent-seeking
payment matrix
game analysis
