摘要
基于发展中国家和发达国家在生产成本和碳排放强度上均存在差异的事实,发达国家若实施碳关税政策,发展中国家可选择是否实施贸易政策(包括出口补贴和出口征税)以及何时实施贸易政策,文章构建了发展中国家不实施贸易政策、与发达国家开征碳关税同时或之后实施贸易政策的多阶段博弈模型,运用逆向求解法求得各模型的均衡解,从发展中国家立场出发,得出了其政策选择的条件以及实施贸易政策的时机。结果表明发展中国家实施出口补贴政策或出口征税政策都有可能是最优的,这要视边际环境损害值大小、各国生产成本和碳排放强度差异决定,但实施该政策的最佳时机总是在发达国家开征碳关税以后;若边际环境损害值较小,发展中国家不实施任何贸易政策是次优的,否则与发达国家开征碳关税同时实施出口征税政策是次优的。
Based on the fact that a developing country and a developed country are different in both production cost and carbon emission intensity, if the developed country is about to carry out a carbon tariff policy, the developing country can decide whether to carry out trade policies, including export policy and export tariff policy, and when to implement that policy. The paper establishes three multi-staged game models individually, and applies the method of backward induction to make an analysis. It shows that the developing country may give priority to either export subsidy or export tariff policies if the developed country carries out a carbon tariff policy, which depends on the magnitude of marginal environmental damage, and differences in both production cost and carbon emission intensity. It also shows that the choice that the developing country does nothing is a second best choice if the marginal environmental damage is smaller, otherwise, the choice that the developing country levies export tariff when the developed country carries out carbon tariff would be a second best choice.
出处
《国际经贸探索》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期39-51,共13页
International Economics and Trade Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71273114)
关键词
出口补贴
出口征税
碳关税
贸易政策
博弈
export subsidy
export tariff
carbon tariff
trade policy
game model
