摘要
股份制公司中股东与高级管理层之间存在委托—代理关系,本文基于股东为风险中性,高级管理层为风险规避的假设,通过构建股权激励模型,探究了股权激励机制对高级管理层进行公司内部投资决策的影响。研究结果表明高级管理层的努力水平与公司给予的股权激励比例以及公司内部投资结构中的风险投资比例正相关,与自身的努力成本负相关。同时,公司的股权激励比例与内部投资结构中的风险投资比例正相关,并且进一步得出股权激励比例的有效分布区间为[1/3,1/2]。
There is a principal-agent relationship between the shareholders and the senior managers in joint-stock company. The paper studied the effects of equity incentive mechanism on the senior managers to make the corporate internal decisions through structured equity incentive model, on the hypothesis that shareholders are risk neutral and senior managers are aversion. The results show that the level of the senior managers＇ effort is positive correlated with the equity incentive ratio and the proportion of risk investment in the internal investment structure, it is nega- tive correlated with their effort cost. The equity incentive ratio is positive correlated with the proportion of risk in- vestment in the internal investment structure, and the effective distribution of equity incentive ratio is [1/3,1/2].
出处
《科技与管理》
2014年第1期100-105,共6页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70871080
71171134)
上海市教委科研创新重点项目(11ZS138)
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2011BGL006)
关键词
委托-代理
股权激励
内部投资结构
风险投资
principal-agent
equity incentive mechanism
internal investment structure
risk investment
