期刊文献+

财务灵活性视角下公司治理与现金持有量关系 被引量:7

在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 公司的现金持有量受公司持有现金获得的财务灵活性价值和由此产生的代理成本的影响。文章基于财务灵活性视角,以2007—2011年沪深上市公司为样本,通过公司治理综合水平分组对比和公司治理具体指标回归分析,研究了公司治理水平对公司现金持有量的影响。实证结果表明公司治理水平高的公司有较高的现金持有量。原因可能是,在其他条件相同的情况下,治理水平高的公司代理成本相对较小,持有现金获得的财务灵活性价值相对较高,因此这类公司倾向于持有更多现金以获取财务灵活性价值。
作者 张宇驰 郝洪
出处 《会计之友》 北大核心 2014年第5期44-47,共4页 Friends of Accounting
  • 相关文献

参考文献11

  • 1Ang,J.,Smedema,A. Financial f- lexibility: Do firms prepare for the recession[J ].Journal of Cor- porate Finance,2011,17: 774-787.
  • 2Bates T. W.,Kahle K.M., Stulz R.M. Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to [J]. Journal of Finance, 2009(5):1986-2021.
  • 3Dittmar A., Mahrt-Smith J. C- orporate governance and the value of cash holdings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007,83: 599-634.
  • 4Dittamr A. ,Mahrt-Smith J. ,Se- rvaes H. Intemational corporate governance and corporate cash holding [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, 38( 1 ): 111-134.
  • 5Gamba A.,Triantis A. The Value of Financial Flexibility [J]. Journal of Finance,2008,5:2263- 2296.
  • 6Harford J. ,Mansi S. A. ,Maxwell W. F. Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008,87:535-555.
  • 7Keynes J. M. The General Theory of Employ- ment,Interest,and Money [M]. Macmillan,London.
  • 8Miller M. H.,Orr D. A model of the demand for money by firms [J]. Quarterly Journal of E- conomics, 1966,80:413-435.
  • 9Opler T.,Pinkowitz L. Stulz R.,WiUiamson R. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999,52 (1):3-46.
  • 10白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,40(2):81-91. 被引量:1369

二级参考文献31

  • 1陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001,36(11):3-11. 被引量:792
  • 2张春霖.存在道德风险的委托代理关系:理论分析及其应用中的问题[J].经济研究,1995,30(8):3-8. 被引量:144
  • 3Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, and Frank Song, 2002, "The Value of Corporate Control: Evidence from China' s ST Companies." Working Paper, CCFR, University of Hong Kong.
  • 4Berle, Adolf, and Gardiner Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.
  • 5Chen, Zhiwu, and Peng Xiong, 2002, The lUiquidity Discount in China. International Center for Financial Research, Yale University.
  • 6Chow, Kogn Wing, Kit Pong Wong, and Frank Song, 2002, "Investment and the Soft Budget Constraint in China", working paper, CCFR,University of Hong Kong.
  • 7Claessens, Stijin, Simeon Djankov, and Larry Lang, 2000, "The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations." Journal of Financial Economics, 58,1: 81-112.
  • 8Denis, Diane K., and John J. McConnell, 2003, "International Corporate Governance. " Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38,1 : 1-36.
  • 9La Porta, Rafael, Flowrencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1998, "Law and Finance. " Journal of Political Economy. 106: 1112-1155.
  • 10McKinsey & Company, "Corporate Governance Develops in Emerging Markets." McKinsey on Finance. 3 : 15-18, Winter 2002.

共引文献1547

同被引文献19

引证文献7

二级引证文献7

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部