摘要
研究基于物理不可克隆函数的超轻量级射频识别技术(RFID)双向认证协议(PUMAP)的安全性.分析该协议的认证过程,发现窃听一次认证过程就能够得到移位操作的移位位数,简化认证协议中的公式,再通过计算可得到阅读器与标签之间的共享秘密信息.此外,PUMAP不能够防止位置跟踪攻击.分析结果表明PUMAP是不安全的,安全性能达不到RFID系统的基本要求.
This paper studies the security of two-way authentication protocol (PUMAP) based on ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification(RFID) of physical non-cloning functions. After the analysis of the certification process, it is found that the shift digits of the shift operation can be obtained by hacking one certification process, then the formulas in the certification is simplified, and the secret information is obtained by calculating between reader and tags. In addition, this protocol couldn't prevent location tracking attack. The analysis result shows that PUMAP is not secure, and its safety performance really couldn't satisfy the security requirement of RFID systems.
出处
《北京理工大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第12期1259-1262,共4页
Transactions of Beijing Institute of Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60217289)
关键词
射频识别技术
物理不可克隆函数
超轻量级
安全分析
radio frequency identification(RFID)
physically unclonable functions (PUF)
ultra-lightweight
security analysis